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Part A 
Europe's current and future energy position 
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1. EUROPE'S CURRET EERGY SITUATIO 
1.1. Energy consumption 
Energy consumption in the EU27 has stagnated over recent years. In 2006, according to 
the latest official data, gross inland energy consumption in the EU-27 was 1 825 Mtoe, while 
total final energy consumption, which excludes deliveries to the energy conversion sector and 
to energy industries themselves, was 1 176 Mtoe. 
Figure 1 
EU27, Gross Inland Consumption and Final Energy consumption (Mtoe) 
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Source: Eurostat 
The transport sector is the biggest final energy consumer. The amount of final energy used 
by the transport sector exceeds the amount used by all other industrial sectors taken together. 
In 2006 transport consumed almost one third of final energy, while the other industries and 
households respectively accounted for 28% and 26%.  
Figure 2 
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Moreover, unlike in the other sectors, consumption in the transport sector, where fuels are the 
main inputs, continued to increase over the last decade. This trend in transport is associated 
with two factors: the accession of new EU Member States with competitive advantages in the 
road haulage sector and the subsequent expansion of road transport in these countries 
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Baltic countries). In addition, some other 
Member States also experienced an increase in their transport sector, resulting in higher 
energy consumption (Ireland, United Kingdom, Denmark, Greece and Spain). 
Energy consumption of the commerce and other services sector remained broadly 
unchanged. Although the services sector in both employment and value added grew at the 
strongest rate, consumption was kept stable through improved energy efficiency. Since 
heating and cooling comprise a large part of energy consumption in these sectors, a shift to 
new, modern, well-insulated office buildings has significantly contributed to this 
development, in particular in the new Member States. 
Apart from transport, energy consumption in the industry sector as a whole (excluding 
feedstock and petrochemicals) remained fairly stable. Industry restructuring in the 1990s, 
especially in Central and Eastern Europe, helped to prevent a rise in energy consumption. 
Restructuring also led to a major change in the energy mix, entailing a switch from solids to 
gas and electricity.  
In the household sector, two opposing developments could be observed. A rising number of 
(smaller) households and improved living conditions that entail larger habitable space, more 
comfortable heating, more electric appliances and the installation of cooling equipment drove 
energy consumption up. On the other hand, new appliances typically consume less energy and 
new dwellings are better insulated. Taken together, these two effects tend to cancel each other 
out and household energy consumption over the last decade increased only marginally.  
1.2. Energy intensity 
Overall, energy intensity in the EU economy (i.e. tons of oil equivalent per million euros) 
improved substantially. Progress was mainly achieved through falling energy intensity in the 
industrial sector, while transport and services, which also showed a declining energy intensity 
trend, contributed to a lesser extent. 
Figure 3 
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1.3. Fuel mix 
Oil remains the most intensively used product in the EU's fuel mix. In comparison to the 
1990s, the share of oil in gross inland consumption has decreased only slightly – down one 
percentage point to 37%. The gas and nuclear energy share during the same period increased 
by six and two percentage points accordingly and in 2006 each comprised respectively 24% 
and 14% of gross inland consumption. The share of solid fuels in the same period shrank 
considerably (by ten percentage points) to less than one fifth of the total fuel mix.  
Figure 4 
EU27, GROSS IN LAND  CONSUM P T ION  
(ENERGY M IX in M to e, %)  (2006)
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Renewables at the same time gained almost three percentage points. Half of this increase was 
achieved during the years 2000-2006, reflecting the effectiveness of EU policies aimed at 
reducing CO2 emissions and dependence on imports. However, the share of renewables still 
remains limited (7% of primary energy consumption1) and measures have been proposed by 
the European Commission to increase this share to 20% in final energy consumption.  
The current fuel mix varies widely in the EU Member States. To a certain degree it 
depends on the domestic resource/production pattern: the UK, an important oil and gas 
producer, relies the most on oil and gas; Denmark, where indigenous production is dominated 
by oil, also consumes more oil; while countries having resources of solid fuels – Poland, 
Estonia – prefer those in their fuel mix. The share of nuclear is considerable in many of the 
countries that have opted for this energy source: France (42%), Sweden (35%), Lithuania 
(26%), Bulgaria (24%), Slovak Republik (24%) and Belgium (21%).  
1.4. Import dependency 
The EU-27 is a net energy importer, despite ever improving energy intensity rate. EU’s 
indigenous energy production is depleting. This import dependency is not a problem as such 
but requires appropriate policies. 
The EU's energy production satisfies less than half of its needs, with import dependency 
reaching almost 54% in 2006. Oil comprises the bulk of total EU energy imports (60%) 
followed by imports of gas (26%) and solid fuels (13%). The proportion of imported 
electricity and renewable energy is negligible (less than 1%).  
                                                 
1 8.5% of renewables in final energy consumption. 
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The European Union in 2006 imported 608 Mtoe of oil. Most of the oil imports come from 
OPEC (38%) and Russia (33%), while Norway and Kazakhstan respectively provide 16% and 
5% of oil imports to the European Union. The EU produces less than one fifth of its total oil 
consumption.  
Looking at the EU as a whole, the situation is better in the gas sector, since domestic 
production (mostly taking place in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) satisfies about 
two fifths of consumption needs. Gas is mainly imported from four big suppliers: Russia 
(42%), Norway (24%), Algeria (18%) and Nigeria (5%).  
Sources of coal imports are also less concentrated – the largest suppliers are Russia (26%) and 
South Africa (25%), followed by Australia (13%), Colombia (12%), Indonesia (10%) and the 
United States (8%). 
Figure 5 
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Source: Eurostat 
Although overall energy import dependency in the EU is high and continues to increase, the 
situation varies significantly from country to country. Denmark is the sole country which is 
completely energy independent, while for some countries, like Poland and the United 
Kingdom,  import dependency ratios are quite low (close to 20%). At the other extreme, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain have  import dependency ratios exceeding 80%, while small 
island countries like Malta and Cyprus (due to their geographical situation) along with 
Luxembourg are fully dependent on energy imports.  
The overall picture masks the very high import dependency on one supplier for certain 
countries. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Ireland, Sweden and Finland are 
completely dependent on one supplier for gas imports, while Greece, Hungary, Austria are 
more than 80% dependent on the same (monopoly) supplier. Moreover, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Slovakia and Poland are nearly fully dependent on one oil supplier (more than 95%). Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Cyprus are also almost completely dependent on a single supplier for 
coal.  
1.5. Indigenous production 
The EU's energy production has been declining, especially from 2004 onwards. In 2006,  
EU indigenous production is  880 Mtoe, out of which nuclear energy comprises the largest 
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share (30%), followed by solid fuels (22%), gas (20%), oil (14%) and renewables (14%), 
although the contribution of the latter is expected to increase significantly in the future in line 
with the ambitious EU policy targets. Declining energy production implies that the EU's 
import dependency will further increase.   
Figure 6 
 
Source: Eurostat 
1.6. CO2 intensity 
The EU emitted 5 143 Mt of CO2-equivalent in 2006, 7.7% less compared to 1990 levels2. 
Following a period of industrial restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning 
of the 1990s, GHG emissions picked up again after 2000. Energy-related CO2 emissions 
represented 77% of the GHG emissions in 2006. CO2 intensity, measured as kgCO2 per ton 
of oil equivalent, has been slowly but steadily declining and in 2006 fell to 2498 kgCO2/toe. 
Figure 7 
EU27, CO2 IND ICATORS
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Source: Eurostat 
Energy industries generated the highest amount of CO2 emissions (37%) in 2006, 
followed by transport (23%), manufacturing industries and construction (15%), and the 
residential sector (11%). Between 1990 and 2006 CO2 emissions from transport increased by 
26%. Transport is the only sector that showed an upward trend during this period. 
                                                 
2  Total emissions of all greenhouse gases, expressed in CO2 equivalent, excluding LULUCF (land use, 
land use change and forestry) 
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Among the biggest emitters in 2006 were Germany (21% of CO2 emissions), the United 
Kingdom (13%), Italy (11%), France (9%) and Spain (8%). However, in terms of CO2 
intensity, which gives an indication of the CO2 content of the fuel mix, high levels have been 
attained in Malta (5 912 kgCO2/toe), Greece (3 882 kgCO2/toe), Cyprus (3 711 kgCO2/toe), 
Poland (3 386 kgCO2/toe), Ireland (3 259 kgCO2/toe), Estonia (3 088 kgCO2/toe) and 
Denmark (3 040 kgCO2/toe). 
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2. EUROPE'S FUTURE EERGY DEMAD 
2.1. Future pathways 
In formulating the future EU energy policy it is necessary to conduct a thorough analysis of 
possible developments in terms of the EU's energy demand. This chapter examines Europe’s 
future energy demand under two main scenarios. Demand in 2020 is projected according to 
current trends and policies (baseline) and in the case of taking action (New Energy Policy) to 
achieve agreed EU targets on climate change mitigation, namely a reduction of 20% in 
greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990, along with a 20% share for renewables in the 
final energy demand by 2020, and to bring about a substantial improvement in energy 
efficiency.  
In the light of these scenarios, overall developments are described and their impact on EU 
energy security and on 2020 objectives is assessed. 
Box 1 
Main assumptions underlying the different scenarios 
The results of the scenarios used in this document are derived from the PRIMES model run 
by the National Technical University of Athens (E3MLab). PRIMES is a partial equilibrium 
model of the energy system providing projections on energy demand, supply and 
transformation including on power generation capacities up to 20303. It is complemented by 
a series of specialised models and databases. PRIMES ensures that energy demand and 
supply behaviour, energy prices and investments are determined endogenously. The prices 
for fuel are determined exogenously (see below). 
Except from the policy assumptions, all other assumptions (technology, economic structure, 
demographic development, etc.) remain unchanged between the Baseline case and the New 
Policy case. Both scenarios start from common projections, notably on economic growth 
(2.2% on average up to 2020), based on short-term forecasts of the Commission and macro-
economic modelling drawing on DG ECFIN work4. 
The Baseline includes current trends and policies as implemented in the Member States up to 
the end of 20065. The New Energy Policy scenario assumes vigorous implementation of new 
policies to make substantial progress on energy efficiency for reaching other energy and 
climate targets. The 20% RES and greenhouse gas targets are assumptions for the New 
Energy Policy. It does not include action on non-energy related greenhouse gases, such as 
methane or NO2, or use of the JI/CDM option previously used in the scenarios supporting 
the climate energy package adopted in January 2008.  
                                                 
3 For a description of PRIMES, see Annex 1 Part A or "European Energy and Transport – Trends to 2030 
– update 2007" at the following address: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/figures/trends_2030_update_2007/index_en.htm. 
4 For detailed macro-economic and policy assumptions, see Annex 1 Part A. Detailed macro-economic 
assumptions are also included in the above publication on Trends to 2030. 
5 This scenario and the underlying assumption and results are explained in detail in the publication 
"European Energy and Transport – Trends to 2030 – update 2007" available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/figures/trends_2030_update_2007/index_en.htm 
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In the Baseline scenario, the price of CO2 equals 22 €/t. With the New Energy Policy, the 
carbon price is equal to 41 €/t of CO2 and is determined endogenously in order to reach the 
20% emission reduction target under moderate energy prices.  
Given the uncertainty concerning crude oil prices6, both the Baseline and New Energy Policy 
cases are described by giving ranges for 2020 depending on a moderate or high oil price 
environment. The moderate price environment means an oil price of 61$ (2005) /barrel in 
20207. The high price environment would have an oil price in 2005 money of 100 $/barrel in 
20208.  
2.2. Overall developments 
Changes in primary energy demand, the evolution of individual fuel sources and of the EU's 
energy production give an overview of possible energy futures of the European Union. The 
EU energy situation in 2020 sets the scene for political decisions to be made (urgently) today.  
2.2.1. Primary energy demand and energy intensity 
Meeting the energy demand is the basic requirement of energy security. An analysis of future 
primary energy demand, also known as gross inland consumption, is therefore essential. The 
level of the future demand is influenced by various factors, including energy prices. The 
impact of demand-side developments is generally measured by the evolution of energy 
intensity, which refers to the quantity of energy necessary to produce one unit of GDP9. In the 
context of the baseline and the New Energy policy, energy savings equal energy efficiency 
improvements, as GDP remains unchanged between the scenarios.  
Under baseline conditions the primary energy needs in 2020 continue to grow, compared to 
the current situation, although at a lower rate than in the past. Given current trends, the EU's 
consumption rises between 5% and 9% depending on the oil price, with the higher increase in 
the case of moderate oil prices. Gross inland consumption would therefore reach in 2020 a 
level of between 1 900 and 1 970 Mtoe. Fuel needed for the transport sector remains the main 
driver. Transport consumption rises by 17% - 21% by 2020, with the lower limit reflecting 
developments under high oil prices. 
                                                                                                                                                        
6 The oil price increased from 60 $/barrel in March 2007 to almost 150 $ in mid July 2008 before falling 
back to about 90 $ at the time of writing this report. 
7 This price equates to an oil price of 66 $/barrel in 2008 money and a nominal price of 84 $/barrel in 
2020 provided that the ECB reaches its target to keep inflation from now on below 2% pa. 
8 This price equates to 109 $/barrel in 2008 money and to nominally 137 $/barrel with future inflation of 
just under 2% pa. 
9 Both energy efficiency and energy intensity are used here largely as synonyms, although energy 
efficiency relates to individual processes and energy intensity to the energy system as a whole; the 
reason for doing so is that energy efficiency is often understood as an overarching policy action related 
to all sectors of the economy (see objectives on energy efficiency as endorsed by the European Council 
in March 2007). 
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Figure 8 
Gross inland consumption (Mtoe) 
 
 
Source: Primes 
In spite of the growth in energy demand, the energy intensity improves under the Baseline. 
With moderate oil prices, energy intensity improves by 24% by 2020. These improvements 
could be as high as 27%, if high oil prices materialise. The energy intensity gains result from 
a structural shift towards more services and less material/energy intensive production in 
industry within a healthy GDP growth environment. They also result from efficiency 
improvements in all energy activities. The high energy price effect triggers additional energy 
efficiency. Higher energy costs are changing investment patterns and behaviour.  
With the New Energy Policy, primary energy consumption decreases at a rate of between 
0.4% and 0.5% pa depending on the oil price level. Primary energy demand would represent 
6%-8% less compared to the current situation and would fall in 2020 to a level of between 
1 670 and 1 710 Mtoe. After decades of rising energy demand, the EU's energy consumption 
would decline for the first time as a result of policies and measures on energy efficiency, 
renewables and climate change.  
Action on energy efficiency (i.e. the vigorous implementation of existing Directives on 
matters such as building performance, Combined Heat and Power, end-use energy efficiency 
and energy services, eco-design of energy using products, as well as further policies along the 
lines of the Action Plan for Energy Efficiency10) could deliver efficiency improvements of 
34%-36% by 2020 depending on the oil price. These gains correspond to 13%-15% additional 
                                                 
10  See Communication from the Commission – Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: realising the potential, 
COM (2006) 545 final. This Action Plan sets a framework for policies and measures for energy savings. 
It suggests the implementation of regulatory measures, improvements of the energy transformation, 
measures for transport, improved financing tools and economic incentives, increased awareness and 
international partnerships.  
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energy efficiency improvements in 2020 compared to developments under a moderate price 
Baseline. However, energy demand from transport would still grow between 4% and 8% 
compared to the current situation.  
2.2.2. Fuel mix  
The current fuel mix of the European Union is dominated by oil, gas and solids which 
represent about 80% of the primary energy demand. Given current trends and policies with 
moderate oil prices this figure would remain relatively stable up to 2020. High oil prices 
could reduce the share of fossil fuels in primary energy demand to 75% by 2020, while the 
New Energy Policy would further diminish their share to 70%-71%.  
With current trends and policies continuing, the oil and gas share in primary energy 
consumption is expected to remain stable in 2020 at a level comparable to the current one. 
High oil prices would reduce the oil and gas share by four percentage points in 2020. With the 
New Energy Policy the figure would be between 55% and 59%, with high oil prices leading to 
a stronger decline in the oil and gas share. 
Carbon-free and indigenous energy sources (renewables and nuclear) in the EU's fuel mix 
would amount to 28%-30% under the New Energy Policy compared with only 21-25% under 
current trends and policies. The share of renewables would increase under all scenarios and 
price circumstances. However, this increase would be partly nullified by a falling nuclear 
share as a result of nuclear phase-out decisions and closure of nuclear plants considered 
unsafe in some Member States as well as sluggish replacement of existing nuclear plants at 
the end of their lifetime with plants of the same type. 
The development of individual energy sources can be summarised as follows:  
- Under each scenario, oil remains the most important fuel of the EU's fuel mix in spite of a 
decreasing share.  
Following a steady increase due to growing consumption for transportation purposes, oil 
currently provides the largest contribution to primary energy, approximately 37%. Oil will 
still be the most important fuel in 2020, especially in transport, due to limited substitution 
possibilities. With moderate prices, the share of oil decreases in a broadly comparable manner 
under the Baseline scenario and the New Energy Policy, i.e. by 1% approximately. With high 
oil prices, however, the decrease is sharper, falling by three percentage points in the Baseline 
and slightly more in the New Energy Policy scenario.  
- The second largest element in the fuel mix of the European Union in 2006 is natural gas, 
which accounts for almost one quarter of the mix. This is six percentage points more than the 
share of solid fuels. Natural gas has penetrated all sectors, with the exception of transport. 
Since the mid-1990s, a lot of the new investments in power generation have gone into 
combined cycle gas turbines technology (CCGT). Low natural gas prices, relatively low 
capital cost and favourable technology characteristics, especially in terms of environmental 
emissions, are the drivers of this development. 
The share of natural gas in primary energy consumption is expected to remain high, above 
20%, under both scenarios. However, given the current trends and policies with moderate 
fossil fuel prices, the rapid penetration of natural gas hitherto experienced is projected to slow 
down. With high oil prices there would be a slight decrease in the gas share to 23% in 2020. 
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Under the New Energy Policy with moderate oil prices, natural gas is challenged by the 
massive penetration of renewable energy sources. The share of natural gas in the EU's fuel 
mix decreases to about 23%. Under high oil prices, the share of natural gas drops significantly 
to 21% compared with similar developments under moderate prices and also the present level. 
In power generation, high gas prices strongly affect the cost-effectiveness of gas-fired power 
plants: high gas prices would reduce gross electricity generation from gas by 21% in the 
absence of the new policy approach and would lead to a decrease of electricity generation 
from gas by 25% in 2020 under the New Energy Policy. Thus, as a result of the combined 
effect of the New Energy Policy and high oil prices, the natural gas share in the electricity 
mix of the EU is no higher than 17%.  
Figure 9 
The fuel mix (Mtoe) in different scenarios 
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Source: Primes 
- Primary energy consumption of solid fuels (mainly hard coal and lignite) stagnated between 
2000 and 2006 at around 18% of the EU's fuel mix. Solids are mainly used in the power 
generation sector and in some specific industrial applications.  
Given current trends and policies with different oil price assumptions, solid fuels are 
projected to exceed their current level by 6%-7% in 2020 following oil and gas price increases 
and the nuclear phase-out in certain Member States. The share of solids in 2020 is expected to 
remain similar to current levels.  
Under the New Energy Policy, coal and lignite consumption will be reduced. The share of 
solids in the EU's fuel mix falls sharply to 13% in 2020 under moderate oil and gas prices, but 
would reach 15% in the case of high prices in 2020. The share of solids in power generation 
would substantially diminish as a result of implementing the New Energy Policy (19% in 
2020) compared to a baseline with moderate energy prices (30% in 2020). The decrease in the 
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share of solids in the EU's fuel mix becomes much more moderate in the event of soaring oil 
and gas prices, which strengthen the relative competitiveness of coal. 
- The highest growth after the 1990s has been witnessed in renewables and they are still 
projected to rank first in terms of growth till 2020. In 2006, their share in the EU's fuel mix is 
modest and corresponds to roughly 7% of the primary energy demand.  
However, renewable energy sources (RES) increase their share in all scenarios. Given current 
trends and policies with moderate oil prices, the additional energy consumption in 2020 will 
be primarily met by renewables and natural gas. Renewables will increase their market share 
in primary energy11 to 10% in 2020 (13% share in final energy). Use of RES increases most in 
power generation, followed by transport. There will also be considerable growth in heating 
and cooling of buildings as well as in industrial use of biomass/waste. High oil prices, 
favouring RES deployment, would add 1.6 percentage points to the market share of RES in 
2020. With high oil prices, renewables will become the fourth pillar of the EU's fuel mix.  
Following implementation of the New Energy Policy, the share of renewables in primary 
energy demand will increase substantially, reaching 16% in 2020 (and slightly more than 16% 
in the event of high prices). Under the New Energy Policy, renewables become the third 
largest source in the EU's fuel mix.  
- As a result of political decisions on nuclear phase-out and the programmed closure of plants 
due to safety considerations in some Member States, nuclear shows a decline in all scenarios 
compared to current levels. In 2020, given current trends and policies with moderate oil 
prices, it will lose three percentage points, accounting for 11% of the primary energy demand. 
Under high oil prices, falling power generation from gas is compensated by higher electricity 
generation from nuclear energy (+13% in 2020), from renewables (+8% in 2020) and from 
solid fuels (+4%). Nuclear would then represent 13% of the primary energy demand in 2020.  
Under the New Energy Policy nuclear energy would account for 13-14% of the primary 
energy demand in 2020, displaying a higher share with high oil prices. 
2.2.3. Indigenous production, import dependency 
Under each scenario, the EU's indigenous energy production declines sharply. The EU's oil 
and gas industry is facing declining resources, despite intensive efforts to increase the 
recovery rate in mature fields as well as in newer smaller fields. Gas production will decline 
at a slower pace (between 3% and 4% pa) than oil (about 6% pa) till 2020 under various oil 
price assumptions and policy measures. Solid fuels exploitation (in particular hard coal 
mining) drops because of high extraction costs, local environment issues in the proximity of 
opencast mines and diminishing state aids. These figures do not include the long-term 
potential offered by unconventional oil and gas (see chapter 3). 
In view of these production trends, net imports of fossil fuels (oil, gas and solids taken as a 
whole) are expected to increase except in the case of the New Energy Policy with a high oil 
price. Given current trends and policies, net imports would increase between 21% and 33%, 
                                                 
11 The RES share is given here in terms of primary energy consumption as it is the case for all other 
energy sources. The political target for 2020 is about the RES share in final energy consumption, which 
leads to higher numbers given that final energy demand is only about two thirds of primary energy 
consumption. For more details see point 2.3.3. 
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with the higher increase occurring in the event of moderate oil prices. Only under the New 
Energy Policy with oil prices over 100$/barrel do net imports of fossil fuels decrease slightly 
in 2020 compared to the current levels as a result of the substantially reduced primary energy 
demand and the doubling of indigenous renewable energy production. This decrease is due to 
the combined effect of policy measures and high prices. 
If current trends and policies continue, import dependency for oil could reach as much as 93% 
in 2020. High oil prices would only be able to lessen it by about half a percentage point in 
2020. Even with the implementation of the New Energy Policy, oil import dependency is 
expected to remain high (92%) owing to the lack of alternative fuels, especially in the 
transport sector. 
Figure 10 
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Source: Primes 
Gas import dependency rises substantially to 77% in 2020 under current trends and policies 
with moderate oil prices, due to the strong rise in the primary gas demand (14%). Soaring oil 
and gas prices, which harm gas competitiveness, lead to a 2 percentage point decline in the 
import dependency of natural gas in 2020. This is due to the lower reliance on this energy 
source in power generation. The New Energy Policy promotes renewables and reduces the gas 
share in addition to reducing coal consumption in power generation. Thus the New Energy 
Policy would further contribute to decreasing gas import dependency. It would stand at 
between 71% and 73% in 2020. 
Similarly to natural gas, solid fuel supplies will be increasingly based on imports, reaching 
between 57% and 59% in 2020 under a business-as-usual development (up from just under 
40% today). The implementation of the New Energy Policy, and in particular the carbon 
constraints under the new ETS, will reduce the reliance on coal and lignite in the power 
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generation sector. This leads to lower import dependency by 2020 (49-50%). With high 
energy prices, however, the decrease in imports of solid fuel is more modest, as coal's relative 
competitiveness will diminish less quickly.  
2.3. Effects on EU energy security and on 2020 objectives 
2.3.1. Energy security 
Energy security is a major objective of the European Union to ensure its economic 
development and the well-being of its citizens. In both of the cases examined, the EU 
becomes more dependent on the external world to meet its energy demand compared to the 
present situation. Even in the event of a reduction in overall energy demand and with imports 
remaining at today’s level (New Energy Policy and high oil prices) import dependency is set 
to increase. 
Currently estimated at more than 54% of needs, external dependency would stabilise around 
56% in 2020 assuming the implementation of the New Energy Policy and oil prices over 100 
US$/barrel in real terms. However, import dependency would be higher with moderate oil 
prices (59% with 61 US $/barrel) and considerably higher under a business-as-usual 
development (between 60% and 64% depending on the oil price assumption).  
This situation is mainly due to the decline in the indigenous production of oil, gas and solids, 
which is not being sufficiently replaced with indigenous sources such as renewables, and, in 
the absence of the New Energy Policy, to the increase in energy demand.  
A still slightly increasing import dependency compared with the current situation, such as in 
the New Energy Policy case, can mask considerable improvements in the energy security 
situation. The energy savings and diversification improvements with more renewables will 
make the EU less vulnerable to the effects of volatile import price developments. In any case, 
the dependency rate in 2020 with the New Energy Policy would be markedly lower than 
under current trends and policies.  
Diversification of the EU's energy demand is enhanced under the effect of policy measures 
and/or prices with a high penetration of renewable energy sources, although the primary 
energy demand remains in any case strongly dominated by the conventional sources.  
2.3.2. Energy efficiency  
The European Council's objective of "saving 20% of the EU's energy consumption compared 
to projections for 2020, as estimated by the Commission in its Green Paper on Energy 
Efficiency"12 plays a central role in the European Union's energy policy. Energy efficiency is 
one of the key ways in which CO2 emission savings can be realised and the EU's growing 
dependency on external energy suppliers can be reduced.  
Given current trends and policies, energy intensity gains of 1.8-2% pa would result from a 
structural shift towards more services and less material/energy-intensive production in 
industry within a healthy GDP growth environment. It would derive from energy efficiency 
improvements in all energy activities. The implementation of the New Energy Policy would 
                                                 
12 European Council of 8/9 March 2007, European Council Action Plan (2007-2009) Energy Policy For 
Europe (EPE).  
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translate into energy intensity gains of 2.7-2.9% pa by 2020. Energy savings would increase 
between 13% and 15% in 2020 compared to developments under current trends and policies. 
Energy efficiency gains result to a certain extent from policy measures, but high energy prices 
also have an impact, albeit less marked, on the improvement of energy efficiency. 
Figure 11 
Energy Intensity (2005 =100) 
 
Source: Primes 
The objective of 20% savings in primary energy consumption remains a key pillar of the EU's 
energy and climate strategy.  
2.3.3. Renewables 
The European Union has set the ambitious objective of raising the share of renewable energy 
sources in its final energy consumption from around 8.5% in 2005 to 20% in 2020. This is a 
necessary contribution to the fight against climate change and the effort to diversify our 
energy mix. 
Penetration of renewable energy sources is driven by two major forces: the New Energy 
Policy and, potentially, high oil prices. Both favour RES deployment.  
Given current trends and policies renewables would represent 13% of the final energy demand 
in 2020. Even with high oil prices, pushing higher RES deployment, renewable energy 
sources would not break through a limit of 15% in final energy demand.  
Implementation of the New Energy Policy will result in 20% for renewable energy sources in 
final energy consumption. High energy prices could add an additional percentage point to the 
share of renewables in final energy consumption by 2020.  
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Figure 12 
Renewables consumption (Mtoe) 
 
Source: Primes 
2.3.4. CO2 and GHG 
In 2007, the Spring European Council set one binding target related to greenhouse gas 
emissions, including CO2, namely that by 2020 a reduction of at least 20% in GHG emissions 
compared to the 1990 level ought to be reached in order to enhance the sustainable 
development of the European Union. 
Given current policies and trends, irrespective of the level of energy prices, the 20% target 
will not be met in 2020. With moderate oil prices, energy-related CO2 emissions are set to 
rise by 5% between 1990 and 2020 – back on an ascending path, after earlier reductions due 
to restructuring in the EU12. Transport is responsible for more than 50% of the additional 
CO2 emissions till 2020. GHG emissions would decline by 1.5% between 1990 and 2020, due 
to the reduction in non-CO2 GHG emissions. 
Transport accounts for a steadily increasing share of energy-related CO2 emissions under 
current policies and moderate fuel import prices, reaching 29% in 2020 compared to 27% in 
2005 and 20% in 1990. After 2005, the share of the power sector and of industry in energy-
related CO2 emissions remains relatively stable, while that of the residential sector declines 
by one percentage point over the period to 2020. 
With high oil prices, energy-related CO2 emissions could stabilise at slightly below the 1990 
level (-2%), due to greater RES deployment and the higher share of nuclear in the energy mix 
compared to the moderate Baseline developments. GHG emissions would be 7% less in 2020 
than in 1990. 
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Figure 13 
Greenhouse gas emissions (1990=100) 
 
Source: Primes 
Implementing the New Energy Policy and with moderate oil prices, energy-related emissions 
could be 20% below their 1990 level. This reflects the EU's unilateral commitment to the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Achieving a 20% cut in energy-related emissions 
solely on the basis of energy policy measures is also compatible with a minus 30% GHG 
reduction target. For such an objective, action in relation to non-energy-related CO2 and non-
CO2 gases as well as greater recourse to JI/CDM credits is needed. The CO2 price required to 
achieve the 20% reduction in energy-related CO2 emissions would be €41 per ton of CO2 in 
2020, which is lower than would be the case if no renewables policies were put in place. With 
high oil prices and a CO2 price equal to €41 per ton of CO2, energy-related CO2 emissions 
could be almost 23% below their 1990 level. This price is consistent with the one that would 
emerge from the "cost efficient scenario" analysed in the Impact Assessment for the January 
2008 climate and energy package, which does not include JI/CDM credits. It is however 
important to bear in mind that the main scenario considered in the January 2008 Commission 
proposal, a policy case which achieves the CO2 and renewables objectives while allowing 
trade in JI/CDM credits, would result in a lower carbon price of about 30€ per ton CO2 while 
achieving less energy intensity improvements and CO2 reduction. 
Implementing the energy and climate policy proposals would thus help the EU in delivering 
on its international commitments. It would also improve the environment and diversity of the 
fuel mix while fostering EU competitiveness through industrial leadership on efficient low 
carbon technologies.  
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3. EUROPE'S IDIGEOUS SOURCES OF OIL, GAS, COAL AD URAIUM 
3.1. Diverging definitions, but common trends: Europe's resources are declining 
Compared to a 'do nothing' approach, Europe's energy demand will decrease if the New 
Energy Policy is vigorously implemented. There will also be less reliance on fossil fuels in 
2020 than today13. However, Europe's energy security will continue to strongly depend on the 
availability of primary energy sources. In the current EU energy mix, oil, gas, coal and 
uranium are the major primary energy sources and they will represent a significant part of the 
future energy mix of the EU.  
Europe has always relied on external supply of energy sources to meet its demand and it will 
continue to do so. Currently estimated at more than 54% of its needs, this external 
dependency is expected to increase up to 56% in 2020, when oil prices over 100 US$/barrel 
(in 2005 money) are assumed in combination with the implementation of Europe's New 
Energy Policy. Import dependency would be a bit higher (e.g. 59% in 2020) with more 
moderate oil prices (e.g. 61 US $/barrel) as fossil fuel demand would be higher. This 
dependency is not a problem in itself. However, it  requires an active energy security policy, 
building up internal strengths through a well-functioning internal energy with good 
interconnections, diversity in the types of energy used, clear regulation for security of supply 
and mechanisms for cooperation to deal with crises. It requires also an effective external 
action aimed at diversification of suppliers and supply routes as well as closer cooperation 
with producers and consumers. In view of the predicted growth of world energy demand, 
competition for resources will get tougher and the market power of the few large energy 
exporters will increase further. 
It is difficult to specify how much gas, oil, coal and uranium still exists in the Earth's mantle 
and how much can be extracted in the future. A wide variety of methodologies is used for the 
assessment and classification of resources and data on fossil fuel resources represents 
sensitive information due to the geopolitical, economic and environmental factors influencing 
exploration and extraction activities. However, an overview of the resources' and reserves' 
situation for the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA), compared with the 
information for the world as a whole, sets the scene for an energy supply security policy. Two 
trends are evident: 
(1) Indigenous resources and the resulting reserves in the EU/ EEA are declining. 
(2) The world's resources/reserves, still relatively abundant, are getting concentrated in the 
hands of a small number of countries. 
                                                 
13 See New Energy Policy scenario, Annex 2 Part A. 
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Box 2 
Resources and Reserves lack common definitions… 
There is no common standard for defining and therefore assessing resources and 
reserves at world level and even at EEA level because the majority of producing 
countries tend to use differing national classifications. There are also private entities 
that publish data on commercially exploitable reserves, which do not necessarily 
correspond to national or international classifications. Among the entities publishing 
information on resources and reserves are WEC (World Energy Council), OPEC 
(Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries), BGR (Federal Institute for 
Geosciences and 0atural Resources, Germany), BP (British Petroleum p.l.c), and the 
Oil and Gas Journal. 
– For the purposes of this document, resources refer to the amount of oil, gas or coal 
that may be present in deposits or accumulations discovered but not exploitable 
under the present technological and economic conditions, and those not discovered 
yet. 
– Reserves refer to portions of oil, gas or coal in place claimed to be recoverable 
under current economic constraints and available technology. 
In the context of oil, reserves are often sub-classified as proved, probable and possible: 
– Proved Reserves are "Reasonably Certain reserves" to be produced using 
current technology at current prices, with current commercial terms and 
government consent. They are also known in the industry as 1P. Some 
industry specialists refer to this as P90, i.e. ideally having a 90% certainty of 
being produced.  
– Probable Reserves are "Reasonably Probable reserves" to be produced using 
current or likely technology at current prices, with current commercial terms 
and government consent. Some industry specialists refer to this as P50, i.e. 
ideally having a 50% certainty of being produced. This is also known in the 
industry as 2P or Proved plus probable. 
– Possible Reserves are reserves "having a chance of being developed under 
favourable circumstances". Some industry specialists refer to this as P10, i.e. 
ideally having a 10% certainty of being produced in the foreseeable future. 
This is also known in the industry as 3P or Proved plus probable plus 
possible. 
The bulk of these definitions apply mutatis mutandis to gas and coal. 
– For uranium, specific categories have been established at international level14. 
Undiscovered resources refer to expected resources based on geological knowledge 
of discovered deposits and regional geological mapping. Identified resources are 
close to reserves since they are recoverable. They are, however, subdivided by cost 
                                                 
14 See OECD/International Atomic Energy Agency, “Uranium 2007: Resources, production and demand”  
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ranges and the most used category is “Identified Resources recoverable at a cost of 
less than USD 130/kgU”. 
– The relations between resources and reserves in the context of oil may be illustrated 
in the following way: 
 
Source: WPC/SPE 
– Unconventional oil and gas can be exploited with improved technologies and 
moderately higher prices. It is generally accepted that unconventional oil includes 
heavy oil, extra heavy oil and bitumen (or tar sands) whereas unconventional gas 
covers coal bed methane, low quality and/or stranded gas, ultra-tight gas formations, 
Devonian shale gas, very deep gas and methane hydrates. 
– The Reserve-to-production ratio (R/P) indicates the length of time (years) that the 
remaining reserves would last if production were to continue at the rate of 
production of a given year. Such a ratio is obtained by dividing the reserves 
remaining at the end of any year by the production in that year. 
– This ratio must not be confused with the time span until depletion of the resources or 
end of production, as recovery can be enhanced through additional efforts or as new 
discoveries are made over time. 
– In some instances, a reserve-to-consumption ratio is used. It indicates the length of 
time the remaining reserves would meet the current consumption requirements. 
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3.2. Reserves and resources found in the European Union /European Economic 
Area  
3.2.1. Oil 
The EEA is currently an important oil producer ranking fourth in terms of global production, 
even though oil production has been declining since 2000 from 6.8 Mbl per day in 2000 to 
approximately 5 Mbl per day in 2007. However, the oil resources and reserves in the EEA are 
limited and represent a small proportion of world reserves.  
As reported by different sources such as BGR and BP15, the proved reserves of oil in 2006 for 
the EU range between 6.9 and 9.7 Bbl and for the EEA between 15.1 and 17.3 Bbl (Figure 
14). At the end of 2007, according to BP, the proved reserves for the EU amount to 6.7 Bbl, 
whereas the corresponding figure for the EEA is 14.9 Bbl. 
These reserves are mainly located in the North Sea area (Norway, United Kingdom and 
Denmark) and in South-East Europe (Romania).  
Figure 14 
EU-27 and EEA proved reserves of crude oil as reported by different sources,  
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Source: Various, calculations of the Joint Research Center (JRC) 
The proved reserves for the EU represent between 0.5% (BP 2007) and 0.8% (BGR 2006) of 
world reserves. The different graphs below show a convergence of estimates and a relatively 
                                                 
15  BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2008, hereafter « BP ». 
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moderate declining trend in respect of current reserves (Figure 15). At the current production 
rate, these proved reserves secure between 7.7 (Enerdata 2008) and 7.8 (BP 2008) years of 
domestic production.  
Figures for the EEA also show a declining trend, with reserves falling even faster / steeper. 
These EEA proved reserves represent between 1.2% (BP) and 1.5 % (BGR) of world reserves. 
At current rates, the EEA proved reserves secure between 8 (derived from Enerdata data 
2008) and 8.3 (derived from BP figures) years of domestic production. 
Figure 15 
Share of EU and EEA proved reserves of crude oil in world proved reserves 
according to different estimates, pct. 
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Source: Various, calculations of the JRC 
According to OGP, the EEA resources for oil at the end of 2006 could amount to some 26-27 
billion of boe. In the light of BGR’s estimates for the resources and reserves of crude oil in 
the EU/ EEA, the production potential still seems considerable.  
Resources are more limited for the EU than for the EEA (Figure 16). However, the remaining 
resources are concentrated in smaller accumulations and fields. Production in these fields will 
depend on favourable economic circumstances and improvement in oil recovery technologies.  
Unconventional oil also offers additional potential (Figure 21). For the EU-25, according to 
BGR, it could represent more than 25% of the conventional reserves and more than 60% of 
the conventional resources. For the EEA, it could represent up to 40% of the conventional 
reserves and more than 55 % of the crude oil conventional resources. 
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Figure 16 
Cumulative conventional reserves and resources of crude oil in EU and EEA in 2006,  
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Source: BGR, calculations of the JRC 
3.2.2. Gas 
The gas reserves and resources in the EU/EEA represent a very modest share of world 
reserves, even if the picture looks better for gas than for oil. As reported by different sources 
such as the Oil and Gas Journal, BGR or Enerdata, the proved reserves range between 2 700 
Bcm (O&GJ) and 3 500 Bcm (BGR) for the EU. They ranged between 5 000 Bcm (O&GJ) 
and 6 200 Bcm (Enerdata) for the EEA at the end of 2006 (Figure 17).  
The proved reserves for the EU correspond to 1.4% (WEC 2005), or 2.0% according to BGR, 
of the world's proved reserves. EEA gas proved reserves amounted to approximately 2.7% 
(WEC 2005), or 3.7% according to ENI 2007, of the world's proved reserves at the end of 
2005 (Figure 18). 
As demonstrated by the illustrations, there is a convergence of estimates showing a declining 
trend for proved reserves of natural gas for the EU/EEA. The decline appears to be somewhat 
faster for the EEA than for the EU.  
Gas reserves are mainly located in Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and 
Romania. 
At current production rates, the EU proved reserves secure between 14.4 (Enerdata) and 14.8 
(BP) years of domestic production (BP). For the EEA, the proved reserves secure between 
19.4 (derived from Enerdata figures) and 19.9 (derived from BP figures) years of domestic 
production. 
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Figure 17 
EU-27 and EEA proved reserves of natural gas, billion cubic meters 
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Source: Various, calculations of the JRC 
Figure 18 
Share of EU and EEA proved reserves of natural gas in world proved reserves  
according to different estimates, pct 
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Source: Various, calculations of the JRC 
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Figure 19 
Cumulative conventional reserves and resources of natural gas in EU and EEA in 2006, 
Billion cubic metres 
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Source: BGR, calculations of the JRC 
 
Some estimates show that natural gas resources may remain significant at an EU/EEA level. 
According to BGR, the estimated resources for the EU are around 50% less than for the EEA. 
On the whole, resources of natural gas for the EEA could amount to approximately 7 000 
Bcm, which more than doubles the current proved reserves (Figure 19).  
 
These conventional natural gas resources could be augmented by unconventional resources. 
The unconventional resource potential is not negligible (See box 3). This potential will 
however be more difficult to exploit, in view of enhanced recovery techniques needed and the 
increasing share of sour gas to be encountered, posing safety issues. 
Box 3 
Europe's remaining potential for gas and oil 
 
Reserves and resources of crude oil and natural gas in the EU/EEA represent a modest 
share of world reserves and resources. The EEA almost doubles the oil reserves and 
resources of the EU (Figure 20).  
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Figure 20 
Reserves and resources – world share of EU and EEA by the end of 2006  
0,0%
0,5%
1,0%
1,5%
2,0%
2,5%
3,0%
3,5%
4,0%
4,5%
Crude Oil Natural Gas
EU-27 reserves EU-27 resources EEA reserves EEA resources
 
Source: BGR, calculations of the JRC 
Figure 21 
Conventional and unconventional reserves and resources of crude oil and natural 
gas  
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Source: BGR, calculations of the JRC 
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3.2.3. Coal 
About 80% of Europe’s fossil fuel reserves are solid fuel (including coal and lignite). Proved 
reserves of coal and lignite may be considered as substantial, although they represent only a 
limited share of world reserves.  
As reported by the World Energy Council, the coal proved reserves in the EU at the end of 
2005 are estimated at about 8.5 Bt of hard coal and about 21 Bt of lignite (including sub-
bituminous coal). On the whole, these proved reserves amount to about 29.5 Bt. According to 
BGR, which uses different classifications, reserves amount to 19 Bt of hard coal and 75 Bt of 
brown coal and lignite at the end of 2006 (Figure 22). 
In BP's view, the EU's proved reserves represent 3.5% of world reserves and 50 years of 
today’s production. 
Proved reserves for hard coal are mainly concentrated in Poland, with significant reserves in 
Czech Republic and to a more limited extent in Spain, Hungary, UK and Germany.  
For lignite, reserves are present in a group of countries extending from Germany to Greece. 
Coal resources are reported to correspond to 476 Bt for hard coal and 83 Bt for brown coal 
and lignite at the end of 2006 (BGR). The WEC, using different classifications, estimates 
these resources at around 24.5 Bt for hard coal and 31 Bt for lignite (including sub-
bituminous coal) at the end of 2005 (Figure 22). 
Figure 22 
Reserves and resources of coal in the EU in 2005 (WEC) and 2006 (BGR) 
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Source: WEC, BGR 
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3.2.4. Uranium 
Identified resources of uranium (<USD 130/kgU) in the EU are very modest and unevenly 
distributed. As reported by OECD and IAEA16, they amount to approximately 105 500 tonnes 
U and represent 1.9% of world identified resources as of 1 January 2007. Denmark holds the 
biggest identified resources with 32 300 tonnes U while France, Spain and Sweden have 
identified resources above 10 000 tonnes U. 
It has to be noted that EU indigenous sources are substantially complemented by reprocessed 
and re-enriched sources. The situation for 2007 is presented in Figure 23. 
Figure 23 
Uranium sources of the EU
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Only a few countries have reported their estimates on undiscovered resources. On the basis of 
the available information, undiscovered resources in the EU could represent 1.1% of the 
world's undiscovered uranium resources. Undiscovered resources are thought to be present in 
Denmark and Hungary. 
3.3. World reserves and resources  
3.3.1. Oil 
The world’s proved reserves of oil have increased at an average annual rate of 2.4% since the 
beginning of the 1980s. According to BP, they increased from around 910 bbls in 1987 to 
around 1 238 bbls at the end of 2007. The situation at the end of 2007, however, shows a 
decline in proved reserves for BP. At the end of 2006, the proved reserves amount to 1 239.5 
bbls. Enerdata considers that the world’s proved reserves amount to 1 339 bbls in 2007 and 
are higher than the reserves at the end of 2006, which were 1 332.5 bbls. In this case, no 
decline in world reserves is observed. 
Over two thirds of oil reserves are concentrated in the Middle East (61%) and Russia (6.4%). 
South and Central America and Africa account for 18.5% of the proved reserves. Reserves 
                                                 
16 See OECD/International Atomic Energy Agency, “Uranium 2007: Resources, production and demand”, 
2008. 
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tend to be concentrated in a small number of countries. Thirteen countries have individual 
proved reserves above 2% of the world's proved reserves. Only seven of these countries have 
individual proved reserves above 5% according to BP. Apart from Venezuela and Russia, 
these countries belong exclusively to the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, UAE and, with 
21.3%, Saudi Arabia). 
BP considers that the world’s proved oil reserves amount to 41.6 years of current production. 
The reserves-to-production ratio for the Middle East is much higher: 82.2 years. It is 21.8 
years for Russia. Enerdata estimates the world’s proved reserves at 47.4 years of current 
production.  
Conventional oil resources have been estimated at 82 Bt at the end of 2006 by the BGR, 
which in this case covers the resources that are proved but not economically recoverable at 
present or are recoverable amounts of geologically indicated resources. The US Geological 
Survey estimates that about 140 Bt of recoverable conventional oil could be discovered. 
Unconventional oil is also believed to offer considerable potential under favourable 
economic17, technological18 and environmental19 conditions. Around 600 bbls (IFP) could be 
recovered, which is comparable to the Middle East's proved reserves (755.5 bbls according to 
BP). This unconventional potential is mainly located in the Americas (the extra heavy oil 
from Venezuela and the oil sands from Canada). With 175 bbls in oil sands reserves, Canada 
ranks second in global oil reserves.  
3.3.2. Gas  
The world’s proved reserves of natural gas have constantly increased since 1980 at an average 
annual rate of 3.4% and the volume of proved natural gas reserves has more than doubled 
over that period (WEC). The world’s proved reserves have increased from approximately 70 
Tcm since 1987 to 177 Tcm in 2007 (BP). They amount to about 181 Tcm at the end of 2006 
(BGR) and to about 182 Tcm in 2007 (Enerdata). This increase in world reserves results both 
from new discoveries and to a greater extent from new assessments of existing fields in the 
Middle East, Asia/Oceania and Africa.  
The world’s proved reserves represent between 59.8 (Enerdata) and 60.3 (BP) years of 
production.  
Almost half of the reserves are concentrated in a limited number of super giant fields (WEC 
2007). Almost two thirds of the new discoveries have been made offshore. Offshore reserves 
represent about 70 Tcm. 
According to BP, around 41% of the world’s proved reserves are located in the Middle East. 
The former Soviet Union accounts for more than 30% of the total at the end of 2007. Oceania 
and Africa represent around 16% (8% each). Gas reserves tend to be concentrated in a small 
number of countries. Only seven countries have individual proved reserves above 2% of the 
world's proved reserves and, according to EIA, Russia, Iran and Qatar together hold about 
58% of the world’s oil reserves (International Energy outlook 2007). 
                                                 
17   A moderated high oil price is necessary for unconventional oil to be exploited under good economic 
conditions. 
18   New technologies are required. 
19  Environmental impacts related to their exploitation are significant. Site regeneration takes time for 
example. 
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Natural gas resources appear to be very substantial. BGR's estimate is that global resources of 
conventional natural gas stand at about 207 Tcm. Some estimates consider that the prospects 
for yet-to-find natural gas could expand the lifetime of natural gas up to 130 years at the 
current rate of consumption (WEC).  
Unconventional resources are considered to represent a potential ranging from about 13 500 
to 25 000 Tcm.  
3.3.3. Coal 
World coal reserves are much more abundant than gas and oil reserves. Proved coal reserves 
have been estimated at between 847 Bt (WEC 2005) and 1 019 Bt (BGR 2006). At current 
production levels, proved reserves are estimated to last between 133 (BP using WEC figures) 
and about 150 (WEC 2007) years.  
Contrary to oil and gas, coal reserves are widely available, in almost every country, with 
recoverable reserves in around 70 countries. Overall, Northern America, CIS and 
Asia/Oceania have an equal share of reserves, ranging from 27% to 30 % of total reserves.  
More than 80% of the world's coal reserves are nevertheless concentrated in six countries:  
– USA (28.6%),  
– Russia (18.5%),  
– China (13.5%),  
– Australia (9%),  
– India (6.7%),  
– South Africa (5.7%). 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2008 
World coal resources could amount to 8 818 Bt of hard coal and 3 075 Bt of lignite (BGR). 
3.3.4. Uranium 
Identified world resources of uranium (<USD 130/kgU) are around 5.5 million tonnes U. At 
the current rate of consumption, these resources correspond to about 100 years of supply 
(OECD/IAEA). 
These identified resources are widely distributed throughout the world. Uranium resources 
have been identified in the following countries: 
– Australia (23%),  
– Kazakhstan (15%),  
– Russia (10%),  
– South Africa (8%),  
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– Canada (8%),  
– United States (6%),  
– Niger (5%),  
– Namibia (5%), and  
– Brazil (5%).  
Source: OECD/IAEA, 2008 
The undiscovered resources thought to be present in the world are estimated at 10.5 million 
tonnes U.  
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3.4. Europe's fossil fuel map 
An overview of Europe's indigenous fossil fuel reserves is presented in Figure 24. 
Figure 24 
Upper (blue) and lower (red) estimations of proved reserves of fossil fuels 
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4. EUROPE'S CURRET AD FUTURE ELECTRICITY GEERATIO CAPACITY: CHALLEGES 
AD OPPORTUITIES 
Electricity plays a crucial role in the economic and social development of the European Union 
and in the quality of life of its citizens and consumers. It is a key sector for the EU economy 
and constitutes an essential component of EU energy security. A sufficient power generation 
capacity and infrastructure – and more generally power generation adequacy - are therefore a 
constant concern, along with transmission and distribution networks. This issue is all the more 
sensitive in that electricity is consumed at the time it is produced and demand has to be met 
all the time.  
Deregulation and liberalisation have profoundly changed the landscape of power generation, 
enhancing the role of private actors. Changing supply conditions and the regulatory 
framework directly impact on power generation. Oil, gas and coal supply prices as well as the 
price for CO2 allowances have a major impact on the future development of Europe's power 
generation infrastructure. As a result of the regulatory framework having evolved at EU level, 
electricity has become predominantly commercial and the market players have made the 
needed investments. On the other hand, energy security is a public good and public authorities 
bear a responsibility for a market design that is conducive to ensuring that sufficient power 
will be on offer in order to meet future demand. In other words, private actors will make the 
necessary investments but public authorities are ultimately responsible for a market design 
that fosters energy security and encourages investment. 
Against this background, power generation in the EU faces challenges and brings 
opportunities at the same time. Europe's electricity generation capacity is at a crossroads (4.1) 
and the way forward has to be sketched out (4.2). 
4.1. Europe’s electricity generation capacity at a crossroads  
The EU must deal with two major challenges to ensure that its generation capacity is adequate 
in the future: (i) promoting clean generation and making capacities available on time to 
produce enough electricity at affordable prices; and (ii) ensuring reliability with a view to 
greater diversity of input fuels. Equally, these challenges have to be considered as 
opportunities to revamp the EU's generation capacity in a way that improves its economic and 
environmental performance and provides greater reliability. 
4.1.1. 0eed for clean generation and new capacities 
Europe’s New Energy Policy context imposes a major shift in the power generation 
infrastructure. CO2 and GHG emissions have to be reduced and these objectives have a direct 
impact on generation capacity, given the share of power generation in CO2 emissions (Figure 
25). 
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Figure 25 
Share of the power generation sector in CO2 emissions 
CO2 emission from Public Electricity and Heat Production compared to 
the emission of the Energy sector and all sectors 
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Source: European Environment Agency (EEA) 
The current situation is mainly due to coal-fired generation, which represents the largest share 
of emissions from the power sector as well as the second biggest share of installed capacities 
in the EU (See Figures 34, 35). As a result of the new environmental requirements (including 
ETS and IPPC), the decommissioning phase of installed capacities could be accelerated, 
necessitating replacement of capacities to keep generation at a sufficient level to meet 
demand. 
The price of carbon emissions (ETS allowances) and the relative costs of Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS) and other low-carbon technologies will thus be among the major parameters to 
be factored into investment decisions for new capacities together with the security of supply 
of the primary energy needed. Most of the coal-fired replacement capacity till 2020 would be 
in capture-ready facilities, that is to say plants which could be retrofitted when CCS becomes 
commercially viable, probably after 2020. 
Given current trends and policies, final electricity demand is expected to increase over the 
period to 2030, requiring additional generation capacities (See Figure 26). So far, at EU level, 
generation capacity has kept pace with steadily growing demand. For the existing generation 
park this means that power capacity has risen from 681 GW in 2000 to 740 GW in 2005, i.e 
an increase of approximately 60 GW or 12 GW on an annual basis, which represents an 
average rate of growth of 1.7% (See also Figure 30). Over the same period, electricity 
consumption has grown at an average annual rate of 1.8%. 
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Figure 26 
Final Electricity demand for EU-27  
 2005 Baseline scenario 2020 New Energy Policy 2020 
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Source: Primes 
Under the baseline scenario, the EU would need a net power capacity in the year 2020 which 
is, depending on the oil prices, about 160 or 200 GW higher than today. Under the New 
Energy Policy scenario, the net power capacity in the year 2020 would be higher than today 
by about 150 GW, with moderate oil prices, and 180 GW with higher prices. In addition to 
creating this amount of extra capacity, it will be necessary to replace existing installations: 
power plants are ageing all across the EU. A substantial part of the current nuclear and coal 
capacity came on stream between 1980 and 1985, and even before then. Decommissioning 
should take place by 2020 or 2025, under the assumption that coal infrastructure operates over 
an average period of 40 years20 (See Figures 27, 28). 
Figure 27 
Age of Operational Electricity Generation Capacity in EU27
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Source: Platts 
                                                 
20 Which explains the significant replacement of coal fired installations during the 2011-15 period 
(33GW) as shown in Figure 39 
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Figure 28 
Time horizon of decommissioning 
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Source: OECD/IEA, 2006 
The recent deregulation phase of the electricity markets has been characterised by 
optimisation of the use of existing infrastructure and a tendency to delay decommissioning 
(See Figure 29). Demand has thus been partly met by better use of the existing capacities, 
which also means that further decommissioning could be expected. 
Figure 29 
Retired & Out of Service generation capacity in EU27
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Source: Platts 
New generation capacities are necessary both to replace existing ageing capacities whose 
lifetime will soon come to an end and to expand capacities to meet future demand. Overall, 
capacity expansion covering both replacement of existing capacities and building of new 
capacities amounts to 360 GW until 2020 (New Energy Policy case), which is somewhat less 
than under current trends and policies. 
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Figure 30 
Overview 
 
Source: Platts 
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On the supply side, remaining capacities seem sufficient in the short and, for certain parts of 
the EU, medium term to meet the demand21. However, without new capacities coming on 
stream, disruptions may occur at EU level from 2015 onwards and even earlier in some parts 
of the EU22, in particular for central Europe (CZ, HU, PL, Slovakia) and Baltic countries23, 
notably as a result of the planned decommissioning of nuclear power plants. 
 
4.1.2. 0eed for reliable, flexible and diverse generation mix 
Power generation infrastructure has to be flexible enough to withstand possible supply shocks. 
Generation adequacy is generally measured on the basis of margins of installed capacities 
(incl. a margin for capacity unavailable because of maintenance/repair or specific 
meteorological conditions) over peak load, i.e the highest expected level of demand currently 
and in the future. These margins are known as reserve or capacity margins and represent the 
extra supply capacity available to respond to unexpected events (extreme weather, unplanned 
shutdowns) while maintaining sufficient operating margins24. They have been considered 
acceptable when ranging between 18% and 25% of the total generating capacities, and 15% 
seems to be accepted as the bare minimum nowadays. With such margins, sufficient power 
can be generated and the whole generation system will prove more reliable.  
In a liberalised market, the issue of remaining capacities over the peak load is of a different 
nature compared with the situation prevailing in a regulated market. The market has to 
provide the right pricing signal and incentives for operators in order to keep an adequate level 
of spare capacities and not endanger energy security. 
So far, in the EU, generation capacity has also kept pace with peak demand (For UCTE 
countries, see Figure 31). Large-scale blackouts which occurred in the past did not result from 
a lack of generation capacities. This general situation is confirmed in particular by ETSO25. 
                                                 
21 ETSO – Generation adequacy – An assessment of the interconnected European power systems 2008-
2015 – Update to year 2007. 
22 Idem  
23 Idem 
24 It should be noted that intermittent renewable energy capacity cannot and is not counted as fully 
available for evaluating the reserve margin. For example, only a fraction of wind capacity is considered 
to contribute to total capacity for determining the reserve capacity. 
25 ETSO – Generation adequacy – An assessment of the interconnected European power systems 2008-
2015 – Update to year 2007. 
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Figure 31 
Evolution of reserve margins for the UCTE countries 
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Source: UCTE 
However, the possible peak demand in EU-27 over the period 2005-2020 is projected to 
increase steadily, resulting in a need for new capacities (See Figure 32). 
Figure 32 
Possible evolution of peak demand and capacity to meet peak demand in EU-27 
(Eurelectric) 
 2005 2010 2020 
Peak demand 
capacity (GW) 
508 543 622 
Total demand (TWh) 3100 3325 3800 
Source: EURPROG 2007 
The reliability of the EU's generation capacity will also be strengthened by a more diverse 
generation mix. Diversity may be a business and a policy aim at the same time since it avoids 
risk exposure, provides flexibility to accommodate variations in demand and helps to reduce 
too heavy dependency on one type of fuel and/or on one technology. Diversity may thus 
foster reliability and greater independence. It is crucial for energy security and should be 
considered when assessing the adequacy of power generation infrastructure in the EU. 
 EN 45   EN 
 
Figure 33 
EU27 Generation Capacity by technology (2006)
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Note: Total Generation Capacity amounts to 762 GW in 2006 
Source: Eurostat 
Diversity is a multifaceted concept. It could be characterised as an energy mix between fuels 
and technologies which is subject to appropriate switching capacities, providing an additional 
buffer against shocks and helping to curb potential risks. 
Figure 34 
EU 27 electricity generation capacity by energy 
source (2007)
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Source: Platts  
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Figure 35 
Source: Eurost at , May 2008 *  Pumped Storage Plants and Other Power Stations   
Gross Electricity Generation - EU-27 
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Currently, the EU's generation mix is diversified (See Figures 33, 34, 35). About 30% of 
power production is from nuclear and another 30% results from solid fuel power plants. 
Natural gas and renewables are the fuels used for the remainder of the EU’s electricity 
production while the role of oil for electricity generation is now very limited. Compared to 
1990, coal and oil have dropped respectively from 40% to about 30% and from 8% to 4%. 
Natural gas has been the major substitute for coal and oil. The current EU energy mix shows 
an increasing dependency on natural gas. Renewables have made their way into electricity 
production while undergoing at the same time a structural modification with an increase of 
wind and biomass and a relative decrease of hydro (See Figure 27).  
With a view to energy security and to balancing supply and demand in particular in the case 
of peak of demand, the generation mix needs to offer generation flexibility between 
technologies. This also makes sense from an economic point of view since the generation 
costs vary according to technologies and load profiles. 
As for secondary fuel in operating power plants, it appears that oil is predominant and 
represents a relatively constant share of the existing switching capacities (See Figures 36, 37). 
 EN 47   EN 
 
Figure 36 
Secondary Fuel Capacity in Operating Power Plants
vs. Age
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Source: Platts 
Figure 37 
Secondary Fuel Capacity
 in Operating Power Plants
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Source: Platts 
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4.2. The future of power generation capacity in Europe 
Massive investments in new, low-carbon generation capacities are needed to supply the 
electricity Europe will need in the future. These investments will deliver the expected results 
only if they are not hampered and/or delayed. 
4.2.1. The potential for new, low-carbon power generation investments  
Under the new energy policy scenario, the capacity expansion necessary to meet the future 
power demand and to replace ageing facilities amounts to circa 360 – 390 GW over the period 
2005-2020 depending on oil prices. This corresponds to around half of the currently installed 
capacity. With the Baseline, the capacity expansion needed amounts to circa 370 – 415 GW 
depending on oil prices. 
Compared to the past, the current investment needs are quite specific. There is a need for 
integrated investment decisions to make sure that the challenges of energy security and 
climate change are properly met. According to the New Energy Policy case, power generation 
based on gas and renewables would account for about 300 - 315 GW of the required capacity 
expansion, depending on oil prices. With the Baseline, this would amount to 265 – 290 GW, 
depending also on oil prices (see Figures 39, 41). 
 
Figure 38 
Power capacity (in GW) 
ew Energy Policy 
2020 
Baseline scenario 
2020 
POWER CAPACITY 2005 
61$/bbl 100$/bbl 61$/bbl 100$/bbl 
Total  740 891 (+20%) 919 (+24%) 901(+22%) 946 (+28%) 
Solids 189 149 (-21%) 158 (-16%) 186 (-1.5%) 203 (+7.5%) 
Oil 67 34 (-49%) 36 (-47%) 38 (-43%) 38 (-43%) 
uclear 134 113 (-16%) 115 (-14%) 113 (-15%) 116 (-13%) 
Gas 181 228 (+26%) 233 (+28%) 282 (+55%) 273 (+51%) 
RES  168 366 (+118%) 378 (+125%) 282 (+67%) 316 (+88%) 
Source: Primes  
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Figure 39 
Capacity expansion (in GW) - New energy policy scenario 
2006-10 2011-15 2016-20 2005-2020 CAPACITY 
EXPASIO 
61$/bbl 100$/bbl 61$/bbl 100$/bbl 61$/bbl 100$/bbl 61$/bbl 100$/bbl 
Total  131.4 134.9 112.6 120.5 113.6 133.2 357.6 388.6 
Solids 8.5 8.9 33.1 35.7 6.1 14.2 47.7 58.8 
Oil 2.9 3.5 1.8 2.4 0.9 1.1 5.5 7.0 
uclear 0.7 0.7 3.9 3.9 2.8 5.1 7.4 9.7 
Gas 60.5 60.3 16 16 13.1 17.4 89.5 93.8 
RES 58 61.5 57.9 62.4 90.7 95.5 207.5 219.4 
Source: Primes  
 
On the basis of these forecasted capacity needs (360 - 390 GW) investments are expected to 
cost around €400 - 435 billion. Over time, investment needs may accumulate in the following 
way (Figure 40): 
Figure 40 
Overall investment needs – EU 27 - New Energy Policy scenario  
  2006-10 2011-15 2016-20 
(61$/bbl) 131.0 131.4 134.9 Investment needs 
(billion € 2005) (100$/bbl) 137.0 139.6 161.5 
Source: Primes  
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Figure 41 
Capacity expansion (in GW) Baseline scenario 
2006-10 2011-15 2016-20 2005-2020 CAPACITY 
EXPASIO 
61$/bbl 100$/bbl 61$/bbl 100$/bbl 61$/bbl 100$/bbl 61$/bbl 100$/bbl 
Total  130.9 137.1 114.3 128.9 123.6 151.1 368.8 417.1 
Solids 12.3 14.5 39.1 46 33.6 45 150.9 105.5 
Oil 5.5 4.5 3.0 3.6 1.1 1.2 9.6 9.3 
uclear 0.7 0.7 3.8 3.9 2.9 6.1 7.4 10.7 
Gas 69.5 70.8 37.1 35.6 36.7 28.2 143.3 205.4 
RES 42.9 46.7 31.3 39.8 49.2 70.6 123.4 157.1 
Source: Primes 
On the basis of these forecasted capacity needs (370 - 415 GW) investments are expected to 
cost around € 375 - 445 billion. Over time, investment needs may accumulate in the following 
way (Figure 42) 
Figure 42 
Overall investment needs – EU 27 - Baseline scenario  
  2006-10 2011-15 2016-20 
(61$/bbl) 127.8 116 130.9 Investment needs 
(billion € 2005) (100$/bbl) 135.2 136.5 176.1 
Source: Primes 
Power generation investments have to be decided well in advance to produce the desired 
effect. Investments are generally made for the long term and there is a risk of delay. In 
addition to the classical reasons for delay such as those related to authorisation procedures, 
investors may be confronted with bottlenecks for new technologies, increasing steel prices, 
and a lack of available engineering skills.  
Provided the investments which are currently planned by the operators are confirmed and 
properly carried out, it can be estimated that future demand will be satisfied (See Figure 43). 
Nevertheless, experience shows that only a small proportion of investments planned or 
announced are carried out eventually. Investments in electricity supply are indeed very 
complex: they are highly capital-intensive with long lead-times both for building and for 
commissioning (i.e. bringing new capacities on stream). Their time horizon for profitability 
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depends strongly on various external elements and conditions, which renders decision-making 
difficult for economic operators. Despite these difficulties, investments needed to meet the 
demand have been made so far. In the current context, volatile prices for some fuels may 
make investors reconsider or adjust investment projects. 
Figure 43
26
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26  These figures are based on information collected from industry.   
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Recent investments have mainly focused on gas-fired generation and to a lesser extent on 
wind power and CHP. This evolution has enhanced the generation mix and reduced GHG 
emissions. It has nevertheless also increased the dependency on gas suppliers from third 
countries (See Figure 34). A greater share of renewable energy will therefore not only further 
reduce GHG emissions from the power sector but will also foster diversity of the energy mix 
and lessen the import dependency on gas. In the New Energy Policy scenario, there are few 
investments in gas fired generation after 2010. 
In that context, all other options ensuring at the same time cost-effective, reliable and low-
carbon power generation have to be explored. Nuclear power constitutes an option if a 
Member State so wishes, provided that safety requirements and waste treatment are properly 
addressed. Co-generation could also help to meet peak demand locally to a certain extent. Use 
of CHP technologies in public utilities and private households for example would release 
pressure on the conventional power generation infrastructure and would limit dependence on 
centralised generation units. Obviously, the flexibility required may also be provided by a 
varied set of measures on the demand side. Smart metering and demand-response programmes 
offering variation in electricity tariffs during peak hours could help with shaving peak demand 
and thus consolidate the reliability of the power generation infrastructure. Evidence suggests 
that peak demand can be shaved by demand-side measures by up to 5%. 
The planned investments demonstrate a further move towards diversification by fuels used but 
also by size with a tendency to build smaller, decentralised units, which would strengthen the 
reliability of the EU's power generation capacity27 (See Figure 45). 
Figure 45 
Total Future Generation Capacity (planned, in construction, in development)
 vs. Size of Power Plants (MW)
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Source: Platts 
4.2.2. A shared responsibility for Europe's future generation capacities 
Private investors have made the necessary investments and no lack of generation capacities 
has been observed so far. However, planned investments will be of value in meeting the EU 
challenges only if implemented rapidly and vigorously. With this in mind, public authorities 
                                                 
27 Leaving aside the challenges for the grid and its management 
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should facilitate investments and the implementation of investors’ strategies contributing to 
the EU's energy security. At the EU level, the decisions that have been made and the political 
stance that has been taken are such that the legal framework may be considered stable and 
predictable with the adoption of the third internal market package as well as the ETS and RES 
framework as of 2009.  
In the current context, the public authorities’ contribution to the implementation of the 
necessary investments must focus on the planning and authorisation phases of investment 
projects. Planning difficulties are often the cause of delays and may negatively affect projects. 
Difficulties in obtaining authorisation to build new plants may result in delays that extend the 
average construction times even further (see Figure 46) or, in the worst case, frustrate projects 
to such an extent that they are abandoned. 
Figure 46 
Construction time 
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Part A 
Annex 1 -Description of the PRIMES model 
Main assumptions of the 2007 baseline scenario  
and of the policy case (ew Energy Policy)
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5. THE PRIMES EERGY SYSTEM MODEL: DESIG AD FEATURES 
PRIMES is a general-purpose energy model that provides projections for the medium and 
long term, starting from 2010 and running up to 2030 with results for every fifth year. 
PRIMES is not a tool for making short-term forecasts. The model can simulate the effects of 
changes in assumptions (e.g. on policies) or in a normative way (e.g. satisfying emission 
restrictions). 
The PRIMES energy system model is a partial market equilibrium model that combines 
clearing of energy markets via price adjustments with a detailed technico-economic 
representation of the energy system found in the EU.  
The model was developed by and is maintained at the National Technical University of 
Athens, E3M-Laboratory. Following on from the first version of the PRIMES model 
developed in 1995 with funding from the European Commission, the model has been 
continuously improved and extended. The current version (4) of the model covers each EU-27 
Member State individually, EU candidate countries and neighbours such as Norway, 
Switzerland and Turkey. Its geographic scope is being extended to the countries of South-East 
Europe. 
The energy baseline scenarios of 1999, 2003, 2005 and 2007 and various scenarios on issues 
such as energy efficiency, renewables, nuclear and climate change derive from PRIMES. The 
Commission departments concerned used PRIMES for the energy and climate package of 
January 2008.  
Main features 
PRIMES simulates a market equilibrium solution for energy supply and demand. The 
equilibrium is determined by prices for each energy form such that the quantity considered 
optimum by producers matches the quantity consumers wish to use. The equilibrium is static 
(within each time period) but repeated in a time-forward path, under dynamic relationships. 
PRIMES is organised in a modular way representing fuel supply, energy conversion and end-
use of demand sectors (see Figure A1). With this modularity, each sector is represented and 
any single sector or group of sectors can be run independently for stand-alone analysis. The 
different modules interact via the exchange of fuel quantities and prices. 
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The model is organised by energy supply sub-system: oil products, natural gas, coal, 
renewables, electricity and steam production, including conversion, and by end-use sectors for 
demand (twelve industrial sectors, transport, residential, services and agriculture). Some end-
use sectors may also be suppliers, for example industrial co-generators of electricity and 
steam.  
The model is behavioural. It also represents the available energy demand and supply 
technologies and pollution abatement technologies. The system reflects considerations about 
market economics, industry structure, energy/environmental policies and regulation. These 
considerations are conceived so as to influence market behaviour of energy system agents. 
Box A1 
PRIMES energy sector coverage 
For each EU-27 Member State, EU candidate country and neighbouring country, the 
PRIMES energy system covers (see Figure A1): 
12 industrial sectors: 
subdivided into 26 sub-sectors;  
using energy in 12 generic processes (air compression, furnaces, electric arc, etc.); 
4 transport modes, 9 transport means and 10 vehicle technologies; 
5 dwelling types (residential sector) using: 
energy in 5 processes (e.g. space heating, cooking, water heating and air conditioning); 
12 types of electrical durable goods (refrigerators, washing machines, television sets, 
etc.); 
3 services sectors using energy in 6 generic processes (air conditioning, office 
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equipment, lighting, etc.); 
agriculture sector using energy in 5 generic processes (greenhouses, pumping, etc.); 
14 types of fossil fuels, 10 types of renewable energy (hydro, wind, solar, etc.) and 
energy carriers such as hydrogen and methanol. 
The modular structure of PRIMES reflects a distribution of decision-making among agents. 
These agents decide individually about their supply, demand, combined supply and demand, 
and prices. The market-integrating part of PRIMES simulates market clearing. 
Box A2 
Set of policies represented in PRIMES 
Taxes, subsidies, tradable permits or certificates; 
Technology supporting policies; 
Environmental policy instruments; 
Market interventions and regulations. 
PRIMES assumes that producers and consumers both respond to changes in prices. The 
factors determining the demand for and the supply of each fuel are represented, so they form 
the demand and/or supply behaviour of the agents. Through an iterative process, the model 
determines the economic equilibrium for each fuel market. Price-driven equilibrium is 
considered in all energy and environment markets, including Europe-wide clearing of oil and 
gas markets. The modelling framework takes into account networks such as the Europe-wide 
power grid and natural gas network, and interconnections with third countries on electricity 
and gas.  
PRIMES also simulates the technology choice in energy demand and energy production. The 
model explicitly considers the existing stock of equipment, its normal decommissioning and 
the possibility of premature replacement.  
The model covers all technologies relevant to the energy system, including the possible use of 
carbon capture and storage. Many details on a great number of technologies such as 
investment costs, efficiencies, load factors, operation and maintenance costs are included. 
Power plant investments are thus determined endogenously on the basis of long-run marginal 
costs. Cost parameters change over time reflecting technical progress. 
Box A3 
Power generation and steam/heat in PRIMES 
PRIMES is particularly detailed on power generation and steam/heat. For simulating 
investment decisions the model chooses from among more than 150 power generation 
technologies with different technical and cost characteristics. The choice depends on 
cost, demand levels and load curve characteristics also in relation to the simultaneous 
provision of electricity and heat. The potentials for each fuel and energy use, as well as 
for the development of new sites for large-scale power plants and also for nuclear and 
wind, are represented through non-linear cost-supply curves for each country.  
Power generation, heat/steam supply by CHP and by boilers or district heating are 
simulated simultaneously in order to analyse possible substitutions and synergies, as for 
example cogeneration (CHP). A distinction is made between large-scale utilities and 
smaller-scale industrial cogeneration. The model represents the seasonal and daily 
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patterns of electricity load and heat/steam load, which are taken into account in 
simulations. The gas supply model also considers time variability of gas load but 
assumes daily balancing. 
The power generation sub-model of PRIMES represents the transmission network across 
Europe and performs a DC-linear power flow simulation, taking into account cross-
border restrictions (e.g. lack of interconnectors). The model can solve either an EU-wide 
power market equilibrium (in which power trade flows among countries are a result of 
the model) or a country-by-country power market equilibrium. 
The model estimates all prices of energy commodities in an explicit way. Pricing is assumed 
to follow a Ramsey - Boiteux equilibrium with possible mark-ups on total costs reflecting 
market competition regimes. Price determination reflects recovery of total costs including 
stranded investment, if applicable. Several options are available for price-related policy 
instruments, such as emission trading schemes, renewables trading schemes, simulation of 
feed-in tariffs, taxes and subsidies. 
The model computes CO2 emissions from energy. It is further linked with IIASA’s GAINS 
model to estimate other environmental emissions (including SOx, NOx, PM, VOC and all non 
CO2 greenhouse gases). 
PRIMES has around 180 000 equations and endogenous variables per Member State and time 
period for the core model. The input data base includes around 220 000 time series per 
Member State. PRIMES is comparable in scope and complexity with the "National energy 
modelling system" (NEMS) used by the US government. 
6. THE BASELIE AD POLICY CASE SCEARIOS: MAI ASSUMPTIOS 
The Baseline scenario for the EU and each of its 27 Member States reflects energy policies 
implemented until the end of 2006 as a starting point for projections which are presented from 
2010 onwards in 5-year steps until 2030. 
The 2007 Baseline scenario takes into account the high energy import price environment of 
recent years, sustained economic growth and new policies and measures implemented in the 
Member States.  
The Baseline scenario does not assume that (indicative) targets as set out in existing 
Directives, such as share of renewables, will necessarily be met. The numerical values for 
these policy indicators are outcomes of the modelling and reflect implemented policies rather 
than targets. This also applies for CO2 emissions that are not constrained by Kyoto targets in 
the Baseline scenario.  
The Baseline scenario is a reference development for scenarios on alternative policy 
approaches or framework conditions (e.g. higher energy import prices), in addition to its role 
as a trend projection. 
The Policy case examines the implementation of the energy policy targets on greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions and renewables (RES), in line with the proposals made by the Commission 
in January 2008. It also includes considerable action on energy efficiency by taking into 
account the vigorous implementation of existing Directives on e.g. building performance, 
CHP, end-use energy efficiency and energy services, eco-design in the Member States, as 
well as further efficiency policies along the lines of the Action Plan for Energy Efficiency.  
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The energy consequences of adopted or proposed new energy and climate policies are 
explored. From the security of supply perspective, it focuses on EU-27 energy demand, 
domestic production and imports to 2030. It determines overall policy effects by comparison 
with the baseline that depicts the energy / CO2 situation without these policies.  
6.1. Common assumptions  
The 2007 updates of the energy Baseline scenario and the Policy case (2008) are based on a 
set of common assumptions. 
- Demographic assumptions 
Projections for EU-27, taken from EUROSTAT forecasts, reflect a slightly increasing 
population up to 2020 with no further increase thereafter.  
The average household size in the EU-27 is expected to decline from 2.4 persons in 2005 to 
2.1 persons in 2030 (UN projections and information from the Member States). 
- Macroeconomic assumptions 
The projections on economic growth (2.2% on average up to 2020) are in line with DG 
ECFIN's short and long-term expectations. 
The macroeconomic scenario reflects changes in the structure of the EU economy. Sectors 
with higher value added develop more rapidly than energy and material intensive sectors. 
However, the pace of change is expected to decelerate in the long run. 
- Energy import price assumptions 
The price assumptions for the EU-27 result from world energy modelling. Price trajectories 
for oil, gas and coal are derived from a conventional wisdom view of the development of the 
world energy system. Two prices environments have been used: a moderate and a high oil 
prices environment. Fossil fuel prices develop as follows: 
Table A1 
Prices of Fossil Fuels 
$'2005/boe 2005 2010 2015 2020 
  61$/bbl 100$/bbl  61$/bbl  100$/bbl  61$/bbl  100$/bbl  
Oil 54.5 54.5 69.7 57.9 83.3 61.1 100.1 
Gas 34.6 41.5 46.3 43.4 61.4 46 77.5 
Coal 14.8 13.7 15.8 14.3 20.3 14.7 24.2 
Note: boe stands for barrel of oil equivalent (roughly 7.2 boe = 1 toe). The dollar exchange 
rate is assumed to equal 1.25 $/€.  
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The oil prices in real terms translate into a nominal price of 84 $/barrel in 2020 (moderate 
prices environment) and 138 $/barrel in 2020 (high oil prices) provided that the ECB can keep 
inflation below 2% per year (their target), which is currently not realised (latest projection for 
2008: 3.6 %).  
- Energy taxation assumptions 
Tax rates are kept constant in real terms at their 2006 levels unless otherwise provided for in 
the Energy Taxation Directive. In some Member States, the EU minimum rates will apply at 
the end of transition periods. During these periods, the Member States concerned are 
authorised to apply lower rates.  
- Degree days  
The degree days, reflecting climate conditions, are kept constant at the 2000 level. This is 
higher than the long-term average (some warming has already happened) without assuming 
that this trend will continue (the extent of which would be very uncertain). The degree days in 
2000 were fairly similar to the ones in 2005. This allows comparison of recent statistics with 
the projection numbers, without entailing the need for climate correction. 
- Technical-economic parameters 
PRIMES includes all relevant technologies for the energy system, including the possible use 
of carbon capture and storage, and many details on a great number of technologies such as 
investment costs, efficiencies, load factors, operation and maintenance costs. As a result 
power plant investments can be determined endogenously on the basis of long-run marginal 
costs. Cost parameters change over time reflecting technical progress.  
The technical-economic characteristics of existing and new energy technologies used in the 
demand and the supply sectors of the energy system evolve over time and improve according 
to exogenously specified trends. According to the Baseline logic, consumers and suppliers are 
generally hesitant to adopt new technologies before they become sufficiently mature. They 
behave as if they perceive a high cost (or a high subjective discount rate) when deciding upon 
adoption of new technologies.  
Public policies, through campaigns, industrial policy, R&D support and other means, aim at 
pushing more rapid adoption of new technologies by removing uncertainties associated with 
their use. In this way, the technologies themselves reach maturity more rapidly as a result of 
“learning-by-doing” effects and economies of scale. In the Baseline scenario, policies to 
promote clean and efficient technologies continue focussing on support schemes for 
renewables following past trends. 
- Discount rates 
Discount rates differ according to the type of economic actor.  
In the case of power generation, discount rates may vary over time to reflect increasing 
competition. Decision-making on power plant investment is simulated by applying a cost of 
capital rate (similar to a discount rate), which also includes a risk premium; this rate ranges 
from 8.2% to 10.5% according to the time period and the size of the typical generating 
company.  
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In industry, services and agriculture the discount rate amounts to 12% for the whole 
projection period. Households have an even higher discount rate of 17.5%. For transport, 
private passenger transport investments (e.g. for cars) are based on a discount rate of 17.5%, 
while for trucks and inland navigation the rate is 12%. The assumed discount rate for public 
transport energy investment is 8%, reflecting the acceptance of longer pay-back periods than 
those required in industry or private households.  
All these rates are in real terms, i.e. after deducting inflation. 
6.2. Specific assumptions 
6.2.1. Baseline (2007) – Main assumptions 
The 2007 Baseline scenario includes policies and measures implemented in the Member 
States up to the end of 2006. This concerns in particular ongoing policies on: 
• Completion of the internal energy market by 2010, taking into account derogations for 
electricity and gas market opening as regards e.g. isolated gas markets or recent introduction 
of natural gas; 
• Energy efficiency (implementation of the building, CHP, labelling Directives, etc; 
national policies on education, information, public procurement, CHP, etc). The assumption 
that the CO2 agreement with the car industry (essentially fuel efficiency) for 2008/09 would 
be honoured had to be dropped but there is still considerable improvement assumed; 
• Renewables (e.g. implementation of measures under the electricity and biofuels 
Directives, ongoing national policies supporting RES deployment); 
• Nuclear (nuclear phase-out as agreed in certain Member States, closure of existing 
plants in recently acceded Member States according to agreed schedules; nuclear investment 
is possible in countries that have not ruled out nuclear or see such investment as unlikely for 
the medium term);  
• Promotion of clean and efficient technology;  
• Climate change (continuation of the EU ETS over the projection period without 
extension to new sectors). 
The CO2 prices in the ETS sector increase from 20 € (2005)/t CO2 in 2010 to 22 €/t CO2 in 
2020. They reflect current levels and preserve the baseline approach of a continuation of 
current policies – but taking into account that CDM/JI credits may become more expensive 
over time.  
6.2.2. Policy case  
The main assumptions of the Policy case refer to Greenhouse Gas emissions and RES targets, 
energy efficiency and energy import prices. 
6.2.2.1. - GHG emissions target 
The Policy case scenario is consistent with the EU's target on the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions by at least 20% in 2020 compared to the 1990 levels (unilateral commitment by the 
EU). This scenario achieves the GHG reduction with energy policy measures alone without 
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use of JI/CDM credits and action on other gases than energy related CO2 emissions. While 
achieving this way a 20% cut in energy-related CO2 emissions, this scenario shows that the 
EU could do better than the unilateral 20% GHG reduction commitment. This scenario is, 
therefore, compatible with the possible case of successful international climate negotiations, 
in which the EU would accept a target up to minus 30% for GHG including action in respect 
of non-energy-related CO2 and non-CO2 gases as well as recourse to JI/CDM credits. The 
Policy case scenario showing a greater contribution from energy efficiency following the 20% 
savings objective endorsed by the European Council of March 2007 is, also, more strict than 
the one actually proposed by the Commission in the Package of Implementation measures for 
the EU's objectives on climate change and renewable energy for 2020 (SEC(2008)85/3). 
For ETS including aviation, full auctioning is assumed only for the power generation sector. 
The other sectors subject to ETS continue to receive allowances without auctioning. However, 
allowances have a much higher price than under baseline conditions as a result of greater 
scarcity following the proposed ETS Directive. Moreover, the Policy case excludes action 
outside the EU via JI/CDM (similar to the cost-efficient reference case of the joint RES / 
climate policy Impact Assessment for the January 2008 package).  
The CO2 price required to achieve the ETS cap of the January 2008 proposal, generated by 
the PRIMES model, is €41 per ton of CO2 in 2020.  
The policy instruments employed to achieve the GHG reduction target are directly linked with 
those for the RES target. EU ETS will facilitate growth in renewable energy; the renewable 
energy Directive will create conditions enabling renewable energy to play a key role in 
reaching the GHG reduction target. Therefore, the carbon price required under the energy 
policy case assumption is lower than in the case where no renewables policies are put in 
place.  
6.2.2.2. - RES target 
The Policy case includes the achievement of a 20% share of renewable energy sources in final 
energy consumption at EU level by 2020. The RES target is achieved cost-efficiently through 
equal RES incentive/support across Member States. This is compatible with country-specific 
targets and full trade in guarantees of origin for renewables, which ensures the cost-effective 
achievement of the EU target28.  
The RES incentive to achieve the 20% target amounts to 43 €/MWh in 2020. Similarly to the 
carbon price, the level of incentive for reaching a given RES target is lower with the 
simultaneous pursuit of GHG policies as a carbon price favours the deployment of RES.  
In the Policy scenario, the 10% target for biofuels is achieved at EU-27 level by 2020, with 
free trade being allowed between the Member States. In addition, some imports of 
biomass/biofuels from third countries are envisaged. 
This scenario assumes that GHG and RES policies continue over time without modelling 
major new initiatives that have not yet been defined in the policy process. 
                                                 
28 This approach keeps the modelling robust vis-à-vis any change of national RES targets that may be 
made in the process of Council negotiations. 
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6.2.2.3. - Energy Efficiency 
The Policy scenario assumes vigorous implementation of existing Directives on e.g. building 
performance, CHP, end-use energy efficiency and energy services, eco-design in the Member 
States as well as further efficiency policies along the lines of the Action Plan for Energy 
Efficiency.  
The same scenario shows energy savings of 13% compared with the baseline, i.e. energy 
intensity declines by 13% in terms of primary energy consumption in 2020. This follows from 
the assumption that a 20% greenhouse gas reduction in 2020 compared to 1990 is reached 
with energy policy measures in the EU alone under the conditions of the proposals made by 
the Commission in January 2008 on ETS and RES.  
However, the need to implement vigorously the Energy Efficiency Action Plan at national and 
Community level remains. This Action Plan offers a safety margin if the implementation of 
one or the other measure were to achieve less than envisaged. It would also help the EU to 
reach more ambitious greenhouse gas targets (e.g. minus 30% instead of 20%) as a possible 
result of international climate negotiations.  
Reversing long-standing increasing trends, the primary energy consumption decreases by 5.6 
% in 2020 compared to 2005. 
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Part A 
Annex 2 – Overview of the results of the 2007 baseline scenario  
and of the policy case (ew Energy Policy)
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Table 1: Primary energy demand, EU primary production and net imports (Mtoe) in 2020 for EU-27  
Primary energy demand, EU primary production and net 
imports (Mtoe) for EU-27
2005 Baseline scenario, 
oil price 61$/bbl
Baseline scenario, 
oil price 100$/bbl
New Energy 
Policy scenario, 
oil price 61$/bbl
New Energy 
Policy scenario, 
oil price 100$/bbl
Primary energy demand (Mtoe) 1,811 1,968 1,903 1,712 1,672
Oil 666 702 648 608 567
Natural gas 445 505 443 399 345
Solids 320 342 340 216 253
Renewables 123 197 221 270 274
Nuclear 257 221 249 218 233
EU primary production (Mtoe) 896 725 774 733 763
Oil 133 53 53 53 52
Natural gas 188 115 113 107 100
Solids 196 142 146 108 129
Renewables 122 193 213 247 250
Nuclear 257 221 249 218 233
Net imports (Mtoe) 975 1,301 1,184 1,033 962
Oil 590 707 651 610 569
Natural gas 257 390 330 291 245
Solids 127 200 194 108 124
Renewables 1 3 8 23 24
Import dependence (%) 52.1 64.2 60.5 58.5 55.8
Oil 81.6 93.0 92.5 92.0 91.6
Natural gas 57.7 77.2 74.6 73.1 71.1
Solids 39.2 58.5 57.0 50.0 49.0
Energy intensity (% change compared to Baseline 
scenario, oil price 61$/bbl)
-3.3 -13.0 -15.0
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Table 2: Final energy demand (Mtoe), gross electricity generation (TWh) and emissions index in 2020 for EU-27  
Final energy demand (Mtoe), gross electricity generation 
(TWh) and emissions index for EU-27
2005 Baseline scenario, 
oil price 61$/bbl
Baseline scenario, 
oil price 100$/bbl
New Energy 
Policy scenario, 
oil price 61$/bbl
New Energy 
Policy scenario, 
oil price 100$/bbl
Final energy demand by sector (Mtoe) 1,167 1,348 1,293 1,185 1,140
Industry 324 368 357 354 339
Residential 307 336 320 281 272
Tertiary 174 205 194 160 154
Transport 362 439 423 390 375
Final energy demand by fuel (Mtoe) 1,167 1,348 1,293 1,185 1,140
Oil 493 540 499 465 433
Gas 287 314 287 255 235
Solids 53 55 56 50 50
Electricity 238 303 302 257 260
Heat (from CHP and district heating) 41 46 44 41 41
Other 55 89 105 117 121
Gross electricity generation by fuel type (in TWh) 3,275 4,078 4,065 3,443 3,493
Nuclear energy 998 866 977 851 911
Renewables 488 824 887 1,086 1,094
Fossil fuels 1,790 2,389 2,201 1,506 1,489
Emissions index (1990=100)
Total GHGs emissions 93.4 98.5 92.9 80.0 78.0
CO2 emissions (energy related) 97.5 105.1 97.7 79.8 77.5  
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Table 3: Net installed power capacity in 2020 (GW) and investments in power generation during 2005-2020 for EU-27 
Net installed power capacity in 2020 (GW) and 
investments in power generation during 2005-2020 for 
EU-27
2005 Baseline scenario, 
oil price 61$/bbl
Baseline scenario, 
oil price 100$/bbl
New Energy 
Policy scenario, 
oil price 61$/bbl
New Energy 
Policy scenario, 
oil price 100$/bbl
Net installed power capacity (GW) 740 901 946 891 919
Oil fired 67 38 38 34 36
Gas fired 181 282 273 228 233
Solids fired 189 186 203 149 158
Renewable energy 168 282 316 366 378
Nuclear energy 134 113 116 113 115
Net power capacity investment during 2005-2020 (GW) 369 417 358 389
Oil fired 10 9 5 7
Gas fired 143 135 90 94
Solids fired 85 105 48 59
Renewable energy 123 157 207 219
Nuclear energy 7 11 7 10
Investment expenditure in power generation including 
CHP during 2005-2020 (billion € 2005)
375 448 397 438
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